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Abstract 
Bachalor’s thesis ’British imperial experience in conflict management in 
Northern Ireland’ discusses British army deployment to Northern Ireland’s Troubles 
between 1969 and 1998. Thesis observes the use of classical British army 
counterinsurgency doctrine, which was formed in 1960s in the withdrawal from 
Empire (doctrine was massively influenced by successful COIN campaign in Malaya 
1948-1960). Based on application of particular aspects of the doctrine (namely clear 
political aim, hearts and minds and civil-military coordination) this thesis describes to 
which extend army relied on this classical doctrine and to which extend was the 
doctrine modified and how new tactics and strategies were developed for the specific 
environment of Northern Ireland. Analysis of British army actions points out that 
army was strongly leaning towards the classical doctrine during initial years of 
deployment (1969-1972) lacking intelligence of its environment and made several 
mistakes because of its inability to reflect specific conditions of the conflict. In 
upcoming years, especially after direct rule of London was imposed in 1972 and the 
introduction of police primacy, army focused on intelligence gathering and fighting 
terrorism and was able to adapt to specific conditions and challenges rather well. 
 
